The University of San Francisco

USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke
Center
Nursing and Health Professions Faculty
Research and Publications

School of Nursing and Health Professions

6-23-2020

Using Open Public Meetings and Elections to Promote Inward
Transparency and Accountability: Lessons from Zambia
Taryn Vian
University of San Francisco, tvian@usfca.edu

Rachel M. Fong
Boston University

Jeanette L. Kaiser
Boston University

Viviane Sakanga
Right to Care Zambia

Melvin Mwansa

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/nursing_fac
Part of the Development Studies Commons, Health Policy Commons, International Public Health
Commons, Maternal and Child Health Commons, and the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Vian T, Fong R, Kaiser JL, Sakanga V, Mwansa M, Chastain P, Ngoma T, Scott NA. (2020). Using open
public meetings and elections to promote inward transparency and accountability: lessons from Zambia.
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, https://doi.org/10.34172/ijhpm.2020.84

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Nursing and Health Professions at USF
Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nursing
and Health Professions Faculty Research and Publications by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a
digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.

Authors
Taryn Vian, Rachel M. Fong, Jeanette L. Kaiser, Viviane Sakanga, Melvin Mwansa, Parker S. Chastain,
Thandiwe Ngoma, and Nancy Scott

This article is available at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center:
https://repository.usfca.edu/nursing_fac/148

http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2020, x(x), 1–13

doi 10.34172/ijhpm.2020.84

Original Article
Using Open Public Meetings and Elections to Promote
Inward Transparency and Accountability: Lessons From
Zambia
ID

ID

Taryn Vian1 , Rachel M. Fong2* ID , Jeanette L. Kaiser2 , Misheck Bwalya3, Viviane I.R. Sakanga4, Thandiwe
Ngoma3 ID , Nancy A. Scott2 ID
Abstract
Background: Community-led governance can ensure that leaders are accountable to the populations they serve and strengthen
health systems for maternal care. A key aspect of democratic accountability is electing respective governance bodies, in this
case community boards, and holding public meetings to inform community members about actions taken on their behalf.
After helping build and open 10 maternity waiting homes (MWHs) in rural Zambia as part of a randomized controlled trial,
we assisted community governance committees to plan and execute annual meetings to present performance results and,
where needed, to elect new board members.
Methods: We applied a principally qualitative design using observation and analysis of written documentation of public
meetings to answer our research question: how do governance committees enact inward transparency and demonstrate
accountability to their communities. The analysis measured participation and stakeholder representation at public meetings,
the types and purposes of accountability sought by community members as evidenced by questions asked of the governance
committee, and responsiveness of the governance committee to issues raised at public meetings.
Results: Public meetings were attended by 6 out of 7 possible stakeholder groups, and reports were generally transparent.
Stakeholders asked probing questions focused mainly on financial performance. Governance committee members were
responsive to questions raised by participants, with 59% of answers rated as fully or mostly responsive (showing understanding
of and answering the question). Six of the 10 sites held elections to re-elect or replace governance committee members. Only
2 sites reached the target set by local stakeholder committees of 50% female membership, down from 3 at formation. To
further improve transparency and accountability, community governance committees need to engage in advance preparation
of reports, and should consult with stakeholders on broader measures for performance assessment. Despite receiving training,
community-level governance committees lacked understanding of the strategic purpose of open public meetings and
elections, and how these relate to democratic accountability. They were therefore not motivated to engage in tactics to manage
stakeholders effectively.
Conclusion: While open meetings and elections have potential to enhance good governance at the community level,
continuous training and mentoring are needed to build capacity and enhance sustainability.
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Key Messages
Implications for policy makers
•
Strengthening health systems to foster community-level governance can lead to improved maternal, neonatal and child health, and open public
meetings and elections are an important aspect of shared control and accountability.
•
Meeting participation, stakeholder representation, community engagement, and responsiveness of the governance committees are key indicators
of transparency and accountability through open meetings and elections.
•
Capacity building for community-level governance and accountability is a long-term process. Governments and development partners should
anticipate the need for ongoing training and mentorship to implement such structures for maternity waiting homes (MWHs). This is necessary
to improve the likelihood that community governance will be sustained.
Implications for the public
Local people who serve on governance committees for health programs such as maternity waiting homes (MWHs), need to explain to the rest of
the community how they make decisions and use money. This can happen during open community meetings where anyone can share opinions, ask
questions, and get answers. At these open meetings, people should vote to re-elect committee members who are doing a good job or replace committee
members who are not. This is democratic accountability, and it can be a way to assure that the people meant to represent community interests really
are doing that. It can take a long time for this process to work smoothly, and will require a lot of effort and possibly some outside assistance. But over
time, governance committees can become more accountable to the people, and health outcomes can improve.

Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
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Background
Strengthening health systems to foster community
engagement and empowerment can lead to improved
maternal, neonatal and child health.1-3 An important aspect
of strengthening community participation is assuring good
governance, systems of “shared control” and accountability.1,4
Community-led governance helps ensure that leaders
are answerable and accountable to the populations they
serve.5,6 Those in a position of authority—community
leaders—are obligated to provide information about or
justification for their actions to other community members,
and should face consequences if they fail to respond to the
needs and concerns of their constituencies.7 Community
leaders can include traditional authorities, religious figures,
representatives of secular government at the local level, and
members of established community groups, such as local
school councils or health committees. Although many studies
have documented mechanisms to improve accountability for
maternal and newborn care at the national or health facility
level, few have focused specifically on mechanisms to hold
community-level committee members accountable.8,9
Two key aspects of accountability are holding elections,
and holding open public meetings so that policies are
informed and overseen/questioned by broad discussion
and agreement.10 In many settings, democratically-elected
community members are more likely to gain public trust and
acceptance of decisions.10-12 Through public meetings, leaders
have an opportunity to interact with people they represent,
and citizens can convey opinions and influence agendas.13
The implementation challenges of community-led
governance are not well understood. Studies have focused
on the internal operations of governance boards,14 and how
the boards may influence organizational strategies and
outcomes,15-17 but few studies examine election processes
or “inward transparency” facilitated through community
governance structures,18 that is, enabling the community
to see into the organization through open meetings and
interactions with board members. An analysis of nonprofit
boards, which often involve community members, may
provide insights to lack of inward transparency. For example,
a study of 300 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
Uganda found that 90% of NGOs had a board overseeing
activities, and 80% claimed that they prepared an annual
report and financial statement; however, many NGOs were
not up-to-date in their reporting.19 Moreover, while virtually
all the NGOs claimed to hold public meetings with members
or beneficiaries, researchers suspected that only a few NGOs
actually circulated figures and reports that were accurate,
detailed and current.19 In Bangladesh, researchers found that
lack of pragmatic planning, weak training of governance
committee members, and poor communication with the larger
community hindered community participation at meetings.6
In addition, issues of power asymmetry lessen the likelihood
that female committee members, or low status members of the
community at large, will speak up.4 Community governance
structures need to facilitate sharing of information across
hierarchies, and to assure context-specific representation of
different interests.8,20
2

This article adds to our understanding of inward
transparency and its relationship to accountability through
a case study of community governance of maternity waiting
homes (MWHs) in Zambia. MWHs are residential facilities
located next to a health facility where a pregnant woman can
stay during the final weeks of her pregnancy. The Maternity
Homes Access in Zambia Project was a randomized controlled
trial designed to measure the impact of a quality MWH
model on facility delivery among women living farthest (≥10
km) from their designated health facility in rural Zambia.21 In
addition to improving the MWH infrastructure and providing
linkages to primary health services, including skilled delivery
care, the project helped to increase community participation
and ownership. With extensive local consultation, a new
locally-led governance structure was created to strengthen
capacity and increase accountability. Consultation was
required to better understand and integrate the new
governance responsibilities with any existing structures for
decision-making in the communities, such as neighborhood
health committees and the traditional chiefdom leadership
structures (as described in the Methods section).
A governance committee with an average of 9.3 members
was established at each of the 10 study sites. Each governance
committee included an executive committee (chair, vice chair,
treasurer, and secretary). The governance committee was
responsible for setting policies and strategies to promote the
MWH mission and for overseeing policy implementation in
the interest of the beneficiaries and the community at large.
The governance committee was also responsible for mobilizing
and using community resources for the sustainability of the
MWH. This included oversight to safeguard MWH assets
and ensuring that financial reports accurately presented its
financial condition.
After the MWHs had operated for about 24 months, project
staff assisted the governance committees to plan and execute
an annual general meeting (AGM) to present financial and
performance results to the larger community and, where
needed, to elect new board members. This study examines the
experience of holding the first AGMs and elections in the 10
sites between February and March 2018. Our objective is to
explore whether the governance committees practiced inward
transparency and were held accountable through elections
and open public meetings, and to examine the barriers and
facilitators to open meetings and election processes as a
strategy for good governance of the local committees.
Theoretical Frameworks
We used 2 theoretical frameworks to guide our study. First,
we applied Andrews and Shaw’s framework of good local
governance to guide the establishment of the governance
committees. The elements of Andrews and Shaw’s framework
include: (1) conform to legislation; (2) maintain fiscal health;
(3) do the right things (responsive); (4) do them in the right
way (efficient); and (5) be accountable to constituents for
process, outputs, and outcomes.21
In addition, we used Derick Brinkerhoff ’s health governance
framework (Table 1), to code and analyze questions raised at
the AGMs, by type and purpose of accountability.7 Brinkerhoff
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Table 1. Theoretical Accountability Framework Guiding the Analysis of the AGMs

Accountability Type

Purpose

•
•

Adhere to policies and procedures for record keeping and financial controls; prepare
proper and timely reports
Control costs; control waste and corruption
Ensure progress toward financial stability

•
•
•
•

Adhere to policies, procedures, norms and values
Document performance
Compare results to targets and report reasons for variance
Organizational learning; question if goals should change

•
•

Ensure community satisfaction with results achieved
Ensure representativeness and legitimacy of governance committee members vis à vis
constituents (elections)
Adhere to procedures, norms, values and proper use of authority

•
Financial: proper recording, disbursement, and use of
financial resources

Performance: support management and effective
service delivery
Democratic/political: ensure responsible officials
deliver on promises and respond to the needs of
constituents

•

Abbreviation: AGMs, annual general meetings.
Framework adapted from Brinkerhoff’s analytic framework for mapping accountability.7

includes 3 types of accountability: financial, performance,
and democratic/political accountability. All 3 types of
accountability refer to adherence to policies, procedures,
norms and standards for proper use of authority. Financial
accountability focuses on controlling and reporting use of
financial resources and making progress toward sustainability;
performance accountability considers documented results
compared to plans, and institutional learning to support
effective services; and democratic/political accountability
focuses on representation, legitimacy, and responsiveness to
community needs. An important part of democratic/political
accountability is to engage stakeholders.8 It is important
for community members to engage in discussion and ask
questions at the AGM. In this way, they can assess whether
governance committee members are responding to their
expressed concerns.
Methods
Study Setting
Community governance structures were established in 10
randomly selected primary health facility study sites in the
rural districts of Choma, Kalomo, and Pemba of Southern
province; and Nyimba district of Eastern province. Further
information on the study site eligibility criteria and random
selection process can be found elsewhere.21 The rural health
facility catchment area population sizes range from 5000 to
11 000 with an average of 49 villages, each an average 9.7 km
from the health facility.
In setting up the governance structures, the project worked
with local stakeholders, including traditional and secular
government leaders. The goal was to ensure local ownership
of design decisions that would set initial guidelines for the
structures. Zambia has a traditional leadership structure based
on chiefdoms with their own set of geographical boundaries
that exists outside of the secular government structures. The
chief is considered the custodian of the natural resources,
facilitator of social development for their people, responsible
for settling disputes among their people, and guardian of
traditional norms, culture, beliefs and values. Individuals
living within a chiefdom are subjects of the chief, which is

a hereditary position. The traditional leader within each
village, the village headman, is accountable to the chief and
responsible for carrying out the chief ’s duties at the village
level. There are multiple levels of leaders between chiefs
and village headmen, including senior headmen, section
chairmen, and chief ’s representatives. Traditional leaders in
Zambia have routinely been engaged in MCH programs and
are seen as local champions. The policies they put in place can
impact community actions: for example, in some localities,
traditional leaders require women to make a payment to the
chief if they have a home delivery (this is meant to encourage
facility-based deliveries).22
Separate from the traditional leadership structure is the
secular government structures, the lowest level of which is
the ward, led by an elected civic councilor. Wards and their
associated secular government structures are aggregated
into constituencies, districts and provinces, and then at the
national level.
Background on the Intervention
Governance Committee Structures and Initial Capacity
Building
To assure that we met Andrews and Shah’s first criteria for
good governance (conform to legislation), we made efforts
to adhere to the formal rules for managing a collaborative in
Zambia, as well as respecting the informal customs of starting a
community-owned facility within a chiefdom. We investigated
local regulations to ensure that committees had legal status
and were properly registered. Consulting widely to determine
who was influential in the community,23 project staff created
short-term, district-level steering committees composed of
traditional chiefs, health facility staff, ministry officials, local
community leaders, and reproductive-aged women, and
identified some decisions the committees should consider,
such as establishing terms of reference for the governance
committees and processes for member selection. Aligned
with stakeholder steering committee recommendations,
project staff then facilitated the formation of the governance
committees at each study site. The stakeholder steering
committees advised that governance committees should have
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representation from villages in the health facility catchment
area, community health workers, health facility staff, and
traditional leadership; they emphasized a minimum of 50%
female representation, in an effort to assure that structures
meant to improve women’s health could have leadership
representative of the target population. Each site was given
the flexibility to adapt recommended guidelines and establish
their own criteria for committee membership. For example,
one committee decided to hold quarterly stakeholder
meetings instead of only holding one annual meeting. Project
staff monitored the process. Governance committees were
created between January and May 2016, after which the initial
steering committees were dissolved. Project staff helped each
governance committee to choose a management unit, usually
an individual or several individuals in charge of day-to-day
MWH management.
To meet Andrews and Shah’s other criteria (fiscal health,
responsiveness, efficiency, and accountability), project staff
provided training to governance committee and management
unit members in management and financial skills. Committee
and management unit members also attended 2 lessonlearned workshops and project staff conducted routine
mentorship visits over 24 months. Additionally, project staff
supported sites to develop MWH operating systems, including
a financial system, described in further detail elsewhere.24
To further reinforce fiscal health and sustainability, project
staff helped the sites to choose income-generating activities
(IGAs). The project provided resources and training for a
tailoring business to all sites, and one additional business of
their choosing (raising goats, running an agricultural supply
store, or running a grinding mill). After paying expenses of
the IGA, the profit from the IGA was put in a bank account
by the committee treasurer. These funds were available to pay
operating expenses of the MWH. The governance committee
provided oversight through 3 subcommittees: MWH
operations, Finance, and IGA oversight. The subcommittees
included 2-3 committee members, and met periodically to
discuss specific issues related to their content areas.
Annual General Meetings and Elections
To reinforce democratic accountability, we created ways for
the committees to gather community input. We asked each
site to hold an AGM after at least one full year of operation,
and a re-election of committee members. The open meeting
approach promotes transparency and allows communities to
hold the governance committee accountable for having used
their power and resources wisely. In advance, the governance
committees in each site held meetings to identify stakeholders
to invite and set the meeting agenda. Each site was asked to
create an activity report to document the MWH’s activities
and results, and a financial report to document financial
performance of the MWH and IGAs; these reports were to
be discussed at the preparatory meeting and presented to the
community at the AGM.
Study Design
We applied a mainly qualitative study design using observation
and analysis of written documentation. Two members of our
4

project team observed the meetings held in 9 MWH sites
(due to timing, the team was unable to attend the meeting in
one site). The project team members took handwritten notes
that were later transcribed. We also reviewed the minutes
and attendance register of the meeting where observers were
not present, and reviewed reports of follow-up meetings
organized at selected sites. We refer to sites by letter (A, B, etc)
to maintain confidentiality.
To assess democratic accountability, we analyzed meeting
participation and stakeholder representation, transparency of
the reporting and election processes, stakeholder engagement,
responsiveness of committees, and change in committee
composition.
Meeting Participation and External Stakeholder Representation
We calculated median attendance from sign-in sheets. We
identified 7 possible external stakeholder groups (traditional
leadership, health facility staff, health volunteers, church
representatives, school staff, government officials, and other
regular community members; described in Supplementary
file 1) who had been invited to attend the AGM. We
calculated the percent represented at the meeting by at least
1 attendee per group. If an individual represented 2 groups,
the chairperson asked that he or she only state one group.
Calculations of participation proportions, medians, and
ranges for stakeholder groups in attendance were conducted
in Microsoft® Excel.
We excluded the 86 members of the governance
committees and MWH management units. While they are
also stakeholders, we were primarily interested in examining
the inward direction of transparency (when those outside
an organization can see what is going on within). In this
sense, we considered the governance committee members
and MWH management unit staff to be insiders, rather than
external stakeholders.
Transparency of Reporting and the Election Processes
We assessed the transparency of reporting through review
of 3 documents that were intended to be presented at each
meeting: the AGM Agenda, Financial Report, and Activity
Report. We measured conformance to the standards
enumerated in training and discussed during preparatory
meetings (see Supplementary file 2). The agenda and activity
reports each had 10 standards (for example, the agenda
needed to include time for opening remarks, presentation and
discussion of each specific report, while the activity report
needed to include the reporting period, planned activities,
implemented activities, challenges). The financial report had
5 standards (for example, the report should include a list of
types and amounts of income, profit and loss statement).
Each standard was rated as ‘yes’ (present) or ‘no’ (absent).
Mean transparency scores for each domain were calculated in
Microsoft® Excel.
For election transparency, we observed whether the site had
articulated to the stakeholders the criteria for nominating and
selecting committee members, and how the election process
would work. We also observed whether an election was held.
If it was not, we asked committee members for the reason.
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Stakeholder Engagement
To measure stakeholder engagement, we reviewed the written
meeting notes and extracted 67 questions asked by external
stakeholders at the 9 meetings. We coded these questions
according to the type of accountability (financial, performance,
democratic) and the purpose of accountability, using our
theoretical framework. Two researchers independently coded
all questions, then met to discuss and reconcile areas of
disagreement. We added one additional accountability type,
“Information,” to code simple questions asked by participants
about the basic structure of the MWH and its associated
IGA. Examples of informational questions include “What
does ‘IGA’ stand for?” and “Who are the members of the
governance committee?” When questions fell into more than
one category, we coded them to both categories.
Responsiveness of Governance Committee
We analyzed how the governance committee members
answered questions posed by external stakeholders by
looking for 3 criteria: demonstrated understanding of the
question, a straightforward and clear answer, and justification
or additional detail to support the answer. One researcher
coded each answer according to these 3 criteria, rating
individual criteria as not responsive, somewhat responsive,
mostly responsive, or fully responsive. The researcher then
assigned an overall responsiveness rating (Table 2). For the
response to be considered fully responsive, the respondent
must have shown an understanding of the question, provided
a straightforward, clear answer, and provided justification
or detail in relation to the question. A second researcher
reviewed the coding and the 2 researchers discussed and
resolved areas of disagreement. We excluded 5 questions that
sounded more like suggestions.
Governance Committee Composition
Project staff collected a register of governance committee
membership which included basic demographics at the time of
committee formation and approximately 24 months later, just
after the AGMs and re-elections. The governance committee
terms of reference state that a member shall be elected to a
term of 12 months of service. However, the first AGMs were
held at 24 months because the MWHs did not open until 6
months after committee formation and the IGAs were not
operational until 12 months after committee formation.
Proportions were calculated for respondent gender, health
facility representation, traditional leadership representation,

and members’ occupation. Means and standard deviations
were calculated for committee members, highest grade
completed, and overall female representation. All calculations
were conducted in Microsoft® Excel. Approximately 12% of
all committee members over the 2 time points were missing
data on the highest grade they completed in school.
Some project staff provided technical assistance, as well
as engaging in research. This may have introduced observer
bias, when the researcher subconsciously projects his/
her expectations onto the research. To limit this bias, the 2
researchers who analyzed data on transparency, stakeholder
engagement, and responsiveness were not involved in on-theground activities.
Results
Initial Committee Selection and Composition
Table 3 reflects the composition and characteristics of the
governance committees upon their formation and after the
AGMs approximately 24 months later. The communities
initially selected committee members in one of 3 ways: (1)
Community elections wherein community members selected
from a list of candidates nominated by the stakeholder steering
committee (n = 4 ); (2) Village headmen (traditional leaders)
nominations, the headmen identified candidates based on
qualification criteria from the stakeholder steering committee
(n = 3); or (3) Health facility staff identified and selected
members based on their geographic representativeness,
availability, and prior involvement in health facility-related
activities (n = 3).
Upon initial formation, the governance committees had an
average of 9.3 members. The average proportion of female
members per committee was 39%, with 3 of the 10 sites
having at least 50% female representation on the committee.
No sites using the community election method to select
the governance committees achieved the 50% minimum
target, while the majority of sites that used health facility
appointments achieved the 50% target. Seven of the 10 sites
had representation from traditional leadership, and 100% of
sites had at least one health facility representative. Fifty percent
of sites also had a clergy member on the committee, while the
majority of the remaining members were subsistence farmers
(data not shown).
Annual General Meeting Participation and Representation
On average, 36.2 external stakeholders attended the AGM
at each site. Mean attendance per site included about 15.2

Table 2. Responsiveness Rating Used to Systematically Assess Governance Committee Responses to Stakeholder Questions at the AGMs

Responsiveness Rating

Criteria

Not responsive

Did not show understanding of question, did not provide straight forward or clear answer, did not provide justification or
detail.

Somewhat

Showed understanding of question, and partly answered the question. Answer may have been unclear or lacked justification
or detail.

Mostly

Showed understanding of question, and answered the question. The answer may have lacked clarity or some justification.

Fully

Shows understanding of question, provided straight forward, clear answer, and provided justification or detail in relation to
the question.

Abbreviation: AGMs, annual general meetings.
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–13
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Table 3. Characteristics of Governance Committees at Formation and 24 Months Later, by Site and Overall (n = 10)

Committee member selection mode

Overall Mean (SD)

Site A

Site B

Site C

Site D

Site E

Site F

Site G

Site H

Site I

Site J

n/a

Health facility
appointed

Headmen
appointed

Community
elected

Community
elected

Headmen
appointed

Health
facility
appointed

Community
elected

Community
elected

Health facility
appointed

Headmen
appointed

At Formation
Number of GC members

9.3 (1.7)

9

10

7

6

9

10

12

10

10

10

Female representation, No. (%)a

39.3 (10.9)

3 (33.3)

3 (30.0)

2 (28.6)

2 (33.3)

4 (44.4)

5 (50.0)

4 (33.3)

3 (30.0)

5 (50.0)

6 (60.0)

Traditional leadership representation,
No. (%)a

8.6 (6.9)

0 (0.0)

1 (10.0)

0 (0.0)

1 (16.6)

1 (11.1)

0 (0.0)

1 (8.3)

1 (10.0)

1 (10.0)

2 (20.0)

Highest grade completed, mean (SD)

9.6 (2.4)b

11.4 (2.2)c

9.7 (2.5)

9.1 (2.0)

10.3 (1.9)d

9.4 (2.8)

11.0 (2.0)

10.3 (2.0)

9.3 (1.8)

8.6 (2.3)

8.7 (2.7)

24 Months After Formation
Re-election results

n/a

No
re-election

Elected all new
members

No
re-election

Elected some
new members

Re-elected
all previous
members

No
re-election

Elected some
new members

No
re-election

Elected some
new members

Elected some new
members

Number of GC members

9.3 (1.6)

6

10

10

9

8

10

12

9

10

9

Female representation, No. (%)a

37.7 (8.4)

2 (33.3)

4 (40.0)

3 (30.0)

3 (33.3)

3 (37.5)

5 (50.0)

3 (25.0)

4 (44.4)

5 (50.0)

3 (33.3)

Traditional leadership representation,
No. (%)a

6.33 (8.9)

0 (.)

1 (10.0)

2 (20.0)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

1 (11.1)

0 (0.0)

2 (22.2)

Highest grade completed, mean (SD)

9.9 (2.4)e

10.5 (2.5)

10.3 (2.8)

9.5 (1.9)

11.4 (1.1)

9.8 (2.9)

11.0 (1.7)

10.4 (1.8)f

9.7 (2.1)

9.4 (2.3)

7.8 (3.8)g

Abbreviations: SD, standard deviation; GC, Governance Committee.
a
Mean proportion for all 10 sites for female representation and traditional leadership (n = 10); b Missing 6.6% of data (n = 6); c Missing 44.4% of data (n = 4); d Missing 33.3% of data (n = 2); e Missing 5.3% of data (n=5); f Missing 16.7% of
data (n=2); g Missing 33.3% of data (n = 3).
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representatives of traditional leadership (headmen, senior
headmen, chief representatives, and section chairmen); 11.3
health volunteers (including members of Neighborhood
Health Committee, Safe Motherhood Action Group, and
community health workers); 2.5 church representatives;
1.4 teachers; 0.5 local government representatives; and
3.4 other local community members (eg, farmers, people
without a listed occupation; Figure 1). The median number
of stakeholder groups represented per site was 6 out of the
possible 7 groups (range: 4-7).

Percentage of attendance

Report Transparency
Table 4 shows the transparency of reporting against the
standards.
• Agenda. The mean score for agenda transparency
was 7.6 out of 10. Meeting preliminaries such as selfintroductions and opening remarks were a common
feature in all sites. All sites also included time to present
and discuss the financial report, and 9 of 10 sites included
time to present and discuss the activity report.
• Activity report. The mean transparency score for the
activity report was 6.3 out of 10. Eight sites had a written
report available at the meeting, one site (J) provided a
verbal report only, and one site (F) did not provide either
written or verbal. All committee members were literate
and sites were capable of written reporting. Most sites
described implemented activities, but only one site (C)
compared actual to planned activities and explained why
some activities were not implemented.
45%

•

Financial report. The median score was 4 out of 5. All
sites included the reporting period, and all but one
included sources of revenue and expenditure. Only 3 sites
calculated profit or loss.
Two sites gave verbal financial and activity reports, and left
out many components in their verbal presentations. Written
reports were generally more complete. All sites except one
voted at the AGM to accept the activity report. Eight of 10
sites voted to accept the financial report. In the sites that did
not accept reports, they asked the chairperson or treasurer
to revise the report to include more detail, and held an extra
meeting to vote on the report.
Election Transparency
The election process was transparent in 6 out of 10 sites.
These were characterized by clear explanations given to
stakeholders for how the election process would work, and
clear criteria presented to community members on how they
should think about nominating and voting for governance
committee members. Two sites (D, G) used a community
selection process (wherein community members select from
a list of people nominated during the meeting), and 2 sites
used a 2-staged selection process involving headmen, who
first gave their recommendations before the community
selection process took place (B, E). Finally, 2 sites used a
2-staged process where health facility staff first selected an
agreed upon number of old governance committee members
who would be retained, before opening the other slots to
community elections (I, J). In the 6 sites where election of

42%

40%
35%

31%

30%
25%
20%
15%

9%

10%

7%

5%
0%

Traditional
leadership

Health
volunteers

Other
community
members

Church

5%

4%

Health
facility staff

School

1%
Government

Stakeholder type
Figure 1. External Stakeholder Participation at Annual General Meetings.
Notes: See Supplementary file 1 for further explanation of stakeholders’ role in community health and development. Traditional Leadership grouping includes chief
representatives, senior headmen, headmen, and section chairmen; Health Volunteers includes members of the Neighborhood Health Committee, Safe Motherhood
Action Group, and community health workers; Government includes civic counselor at ward level; Other community members includes farmers and those who did not
state occupation or affiliation.

Table 4. Transparency of 10 MWH Reports Presented at Annual General Meetings

Actual Average Points

Total Possible Points

Average Score ( Average Points/possible)

Actual Range

Meeting Agenda

7.6

10

76%

5-10

Activity (Chairperson's) report

6.3

10

63%

0-10

Financial (Treasurer's) report

4

5

80%

1-5

Abbreviation: MWH, maternity waiting home.
Note: See Supplementary file 2 for the criteria. Each criterion was worth 1 point.
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–13

7

Vian et al

new members took place, diverse groups of stakeholders were
present (median: 5.5 stakeholder groups represented, range:
4-7).
Sites A and F did not hold elections because the membership
of the governance committee is tied to the Neighborhood
Health Committee (see Supplementary file 1) election process
and driven by different timing; site H did not have selection
criteria, so they postponed elections; and site C decided it was
too soon to hold elections.
In general, the governance committee secretary was
responsible for inviting stakeholders to the AGM. In 2 sites
(B and I), the only stakeholders invited to the AGM were
traditional leaders. Other community stakeholders such as
health volunteers, an important cohort of potential candidates
for the governance committee, did not know about the
meeting. As a result, although some additional stakeholders
did find out about the AGM, few people expressed interest in
being a candidate for election. The committees at these sites
decided to hold another AGM 2 weeks later, at which all key
stakeholders were present to elect the new committee.
Table 3 and the next section on committee composition
after elections detail how the membership of the committees
changed with the elections.
Committee Composition After Elections
Site B elected a completely new set of committee members,

while site E re-elected all the old members. Four sites (D, G,
I, and J) re-elected some current committee members but
replaced others. The average number of committee members
remained consistent at 9.3 after re-elections. Average female
representation on the committees remained virtually the same
(39% at formation, 38% after elections); however, only 2 sites
reached 50% female membership, down from 3 at formation.
The number of committees with traditional leadership
representation also decreased from 7 to 4. All sites retained
representation from their associated health centers.
Stakeholder Engagement
Table 5 illustrates types of questions asked according to the type
of accountability they may have helped to promote. Most of the
questions related to financial issues (43%), and accountability
for program performance (28%). Twelve percent of the
questions were categorized as democratic accountability, that
is, questioning how well the representatives were exercising
proper authority on behalf of the community. The remainder
of the questions (16%) were more informational in nature,
where people just wanted to understand how many people
were on the committee, or whether someone was being paid.
Two questions were about topics not specific to the MWH: for
example, one observer asked when the health center would
receive a replacement for the clinical officer, and another
asked when staff housing construction would be completed.

Table 5. Questions From External Stakeholders Asked at AGMs, by Type of Question and Purpose of Accountability

Type of Accountability

Financial

Purpose of Accountability

Question (Quote)

Adherence to policies,
procedures, and proper
reporting

"Do the tailors have a [bank] account, and is it a group or a personal account?"

Cost control, reduce waste,
prevent corruption

Performance

"Why do you buy stock from district A instead of district B which is nearby and could reduce on
costs?"
"The figures for the workers are not adding up. According to your figures the workers are getting
paid less than what you have reported."

Progress towards stability

"Has the Governance Committee solicited for funding support from elsewhere?"

Adherence to policies and
procedures

"Do you have all the trading certificates for your business?"

Documentation of
performance

"Have you evaluated the competency of the tailors after mentorship lessons to determine
whether you are making progress or not?"

Comparison of performance
results to targets

"Your report said that the dip tank [for goat rearing] is leaking. What is the way forward?"

Organizational learning

"The IGA should consider reducing the prices. Market research should be done and check what
the prices around are. At the moment your prices are a bit high."

Satisfaction/responsiveness

"Why have you not implemented the headmen's resolution as was agreed in last quarter's
meeting, that maize bran should be given back to customers?"

Representativeness

"The Agenda states that we are supposed to have elections. Why should we have elections when
the current Governance Committee has been trained and they are doing a great job?"

Transparency

"Why have you prioritized the construction of the verandah at the expense of the toilet, given
the cholera situation?"

Adherence and proper use of
authority

"Why do you have same people in both the governance committee and the sub-committees? We
all want to be part of the committee!"

Understanding procedure

“When did the tuck-shop open?”

Democratic

Information

"Headmen's contribution has not been mentioned. No matter how little it is, it would be
important to know how much was received."

Abbreviations: AGMs, annual general meetings; IGA, income-generating activity.
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As the committee answered these questions, they were coded
under performance accountability.
Responsiveness of Committee
Table 6 illustrates answers rated as fully, mostly, somewhat, or
not responsive to questions. Governance committee members
generally had a good understanding of the questions posed by

external stakeholders. About 40% of the responses were fully
responsive, and an additional 19% were mostly responsive. At
times, responses were convoluted or only partially answered
the question. Some governance committee members had
difficulty responding to questions in sites where they either
had not prepared written reports, or where the member
presenting the report was not the same person who had

Table 6. Examples of Governance Committee Answers to Questions Asked by External Stakeholders at AGMs, by Level of Responsiveness

Question

Answer

Observation
Fully Responsive

You mentioned that you have registered
as a cooperative. Who are the members
to that cooperative? (Site D)

When registering, we register the GC as the
executive for the Cooperative; however, the
membership for the cooperative is the community.

Directly and clearly answered the question, providing
detail about the role of GC as executive.

Are there responsibilities for the waiting
mothers and their companion that we
need to know? There are complaints that
the mother is being given a lot of work.
(Site H)

The MU’s role is to supervise the mothers while
they are staying here. It is the responsibility of the
waiting mothers and their companions to keep
the place clean and ensure that they wash the
beddings when they are discharged.

Clearly explained the responsibilities of the mothers and
gave information about the role of MU staff. Could have
promised to watch for trends/other complaints.

20 out of 34 headmen honored their pledges.
What made other headmen fail to honor
Reminders were sent to those who have not
Answered the question, although GC did not know the
their pledges [to support the MWH]?
honored their pledges, but to no avail. The Health motivations of the headmen. A follow-up action was
Were they reminded? How many failed to
Centre Committee was mandated to follow-up with identified involving the Health Centre Committee.
honor their pledges? (Site I)
the other headmen.
Mostly Responsive
What was the cost of building the agroshop and tuck shop? [Answer: K2300].
Follow-up question: Is that the total
amount? (Site G)

No, that only covers blocks and labour cost. The
treasurer’ report has more details. Almost all
building materials were donated by [the Project].

The question was eventually answered, but the
participant needed to ask a follow-up question to
understand that the cost was only partial.

Is your job as a GC member voluntary?
(Site C)

Yes, it is.

The answer might have explained others who are paid,
eg, MU and/or IGA staff, or benefits GC members receive
in-kind (training).

Are you making profit or loss at the
hammer mill? (Site I)

Yes we are making profit, though we had.
breakdown which led us to having more
expenditures.

It is not entirely clear if the breakdown explains the size
of profit, or if GC thinks hammer mill may not have a
profit in the future.

Somewhat Responsive
It appears you recorded a decline in
utilization [of the MWH] between
December and January 2018. What could
be the reason? (Site J)

Answer gives a possible reason; however, explanation
of the logical connection between farming and use of
MWH would be helpful. GC could also mention normal
variability in data.

Farming period could be the cause.

How much money have you incurred
in the losses? What is the rationale of
proposing to increase the salaries of the
workers when you are incurring losses?
(Site H)

The workers have been working for a year and so
we are proposing, like in any other organization,
Did not answer first part of question regarding losses. Did
that there is a yearly increase. The increment is a
not show an understanding that funds must be available
way of motivating the workers – it is still a plan and in order to raise salaries.
it can be shot down.

Your report said that the dip tank is
leaking, what is the way forward? (Site C)

At the moment goats are being sprayed.

Answer explains the short-term solution to the problem,
but does not explain how the problem will be resolved in
future.

Not Responsive
How will the GC as a cooperative be
reporting to PACRA? (Site C)
Your report is confusing because it is
mixing income and expenditure at the
same time (Site B)
The figures for the workers are not adding
up. According to your figures, the workers
are getting paid less than what you have
reported (Site H)

It is important to register with PACRA because we
shall be selling goats in bulk.

Did not answer question about the type of reporting
required.

Yes, I have misplaced the original report. So this
was hurriedly done for this meeting.

Did not explain steps that would be taken to find out the
answer to the question.

This could have be a result of miscalculation. Kindly
Did not explain how the GC will share the new financial
allow us more time to work on a new financial
report with the community.
report.

Abbreviations: GC, Governance Committee; IGA, income generating activity; MU, management unit; MWH, maternity waiting home; PACRA, Patents and
Companies Registration Agency; AGMs, annual general meetings.
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prepared the report. This often led to long debates, especially
related to finances.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to shed light on the structures and
processes of community-led governance and accountability
for a MWH intervention in rural Zambia. Specifically, we
examined open public meetings facilitated by governance
committees to see how they promoted “inward transparency,”
that is, the ability for community members to see how
community leaders were making decisions and managing
resources to achieve goals for the public good. We also
examined democratic accountability in terms of election of
committee members.
We found that on average, many different stakeholders
attended meetings, and reports were transparent.
Stakeholders asked probing questions, especially about
financial matters, and governance committee members were
generally responsive to questions. Half the sites used elections
to replace committee members, demonstrating democratic
accountability.
These findings are similar to Papp et al, who found
that public hearings in Orissa, India, enhanced social
accountability by providing participants with a safe space to
describe their needs, and helped women and communities
to see maternal health services as a right rather than a
“kindness.”25 The public comment period at open meetings
facilitates transparency in 2 ways. It allows officials to respond
directly to citizen complaints, but it also raises topics that
officials may report back on at a subsequent meeting.26 Given
the timing of our study, we were unable to measure these less
immediate transparency gains. The results of the elections
to replace governance committee members in 5 sites also
suggest enhanced social accountability. This is similar to
findings in Uganda, where communities that participated
in a monitoring intervention were more likely to replace
governance committee members compared to control sites.27
While AGMs and elections worked generally as expected,
the effectiveness of these specific governance activities in
promoting inward transparency and accountability was
handicapped by committee members’ lack of preparation for
the AGM, a narrow focus on financial accountability, and
failure of the committees to adopt a strategic performance
management perspective.
First, many committees did not perform as expected in
preparing for the AGM. Collaboration for community wellbeing depends on information sharing and mutual goals,28 and
trust among the different stakeholders can help to harmonize
individual interests with community needs.29 Yet, several
governance committees had incomplete reports and seemed
unprepared to answer questions, thus missing opportunities
to increase understanding and trust within the community.
In addition, lack of preparation meant that elections were
not held in 4 of 10 sites, and where elections were held, the
proportion of sites with 50% or more women on committees
declined, as did representation of traditional leaders. The loss
of representation by traditional leaders is significant as the
leaders have influence at the village level and can promote use
10

of MWHs.
The second major factor inhibiting transparency and
accountability was a narrow focus on financial accountability.
External stakeholders asked few questions about nonfinancial performance, such as the MWH’s ability to deliver
quality services, the efficiency, or the committee’s success in
promoting organizational growth. The lack of attention to
performance transparency includes the failure to incorporate
the perspectives of women who had stayed at the MWH.
Performance data monitoring and review feature in the
accountability framework proposed by the United Nations
Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s
and Children’s Health30 and can help guide service delivery
improvements.9,31 Inclusion of the perspectives of key
populations — for example, health service users and people
living with or affected by disease — is a core governance
principle of organizations like the Global Fund,32 the World
Health Organization (WHO),33 and the World Bank.34
Participatory approaches in health require power-sharing with
health service users in order to be truly transformative.35,36
Finally, the lack of strategic management perspective
resulted in missed opportunities to promote accountability
for responsive actions. For example, AGM participants
asked specific questions about the tailoring IGA. While the
committee members directly answered these questions, they
missed the opportunity to lead the discussion at a higher
level: the tailoring IGAs were less successful than other
IGAs due to machines that kept breaking down, and there
was too little demand for the finished products. The AGM
could have been used to reevaluate whether the tailoring
IGAs should be continued, given these challenges. In another
example, one community member questioned why mothers
or their companions had to help with cleaning while staying
in the MWH. The committee member explained the current
rationale, and the discussion moved on to another topic.
Yet, this question points to a need to possibly reconsider the
policy, or to sensitize community members about the need
for volunteer assistance in managing the MWHs. Similarly,
a stakeholder asked about monthly variation in MWH
stays. The governance committee member related this to
the farming season, implying that women are choosing not
to go to the MWH in order to work in the fields. Yet, the
governance committee missed the chance to discuss the
broader implications for access to the MWH and skilled
delivery during the farming season, and strategies to
overcome barriers to use the homes during this time. Some
of these barriers include having funds to purchase required
items for the baby and mother during delivery, and having a
relative at home to take care of other children.22,37-39
Despite project-sponsored governance and financial
trainings, as well as mentorship over a period of 24 months,
more effort, or different approaches, were needed to increase
the members’ capacity for community governance and
accountability. Several factors could improve the open
meeting and election process in the future and in other
settings, including better meeting preparation and facilitation,
strengthening performance data, and focused mentoring.
These factors should be considered by policy-makers,
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program managers, and development partners interested in
promoting community-owned MWHs. The factors may even
help support the health services locally beyond the MWHs.
Preparing for Meetings and Meeting Facilitation
The project provided general guidelines for the AGM and
preparatory meetings, but the committees required further
normative guidance. Based on this experience, the project
created written templates for the AGM Agenda, Activity, and
Finance Reports (see Supplementary file 3), and a checklist
of stakeholders to invite to the meeting. Written reporting
templates can help ensure that key information is included.
Program managers should assure that committee members
understand the reports. A run-through of the meeting, using
a set of possible questions derived from previous meetings,
may be helpful. The members need to be prepared to explain
their role, give more details behind decisions, and describe
their vision for the future. Committee members also need
to develop skills in how to anticipate questions and manage
discussion among community members attending the public
meetings. Holding a “mock” meeting as part of preparatory
training, with project staff asking potentially contentious
questions, could help committee members gain confidence,
apply judgement, and develop meeting management skills.40,41
Strengthening Performance Data
It may be helpful to ask interested stakeholders to evaluate
governance committee and MWH performance prior to the
open public meeting and elections. This would better prepare
meeting participants to discuss results and vote. Indicators
for the governance committee could include governance
committee members’ attendance at quarterly meetings, and
existence of good meeting minutes. MWH performance
metrics might include average length of stay, occupancy rate,
and satisfaction ratings from women using it. This could
help build a culture of organizational learning focused on
opportunities for growth and change.42
Focused Mentoring
A barrier to democratic accountability in some sites was
a lack of community understanding of the purpose of
elections. In 2 communities, stakeholders wondered why
elections were needed if the current governance committee
was performing well. Methodologies for electing governance
committee members were complicated by the difficulty
of communication across the multiple villages served by
each site. Technical assistance and mentoring provided by
government or development partners may help contextually
adapt the election models and assure deeper understanding
of the governance committee’s roles and responsibilities. This
is especially important as members are replaced through
elections. Our analysis suggests that this technical assistance
may be needed for a longer period than 24 months, with
implications for program costs. A critical question is whether
the extensive inputs in the committees are likely to be
sustained if the donor funds are not available. Models for local
technical assistance could be explored to extend mentoring

for community leaders; for example, the Ministry of Health
could partner with the Ministry of Community Development
and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Gender. It is within the
scope of influence of these government agencies to support
and empower community and women leaders.
The AGMs did not meet expectations related to
representation of the views of women of reproductive age.
None of the sites designed election processes that explicitly
encouraged affirmative action with regard to gender
representation. This is something to address in the future,
perhaps through different models such as strengthening
the role of health facility staff in MWH governance43 or
incorporating user feedback interviews into AGM planning.44
Researchers in Benin found that conducting personalized
feedback interviews with women and their companions
after receiving maternal care, helped women to overcome
institutionalized norms of passivity and to redress injustices
they experienced.36 The data thus obtained can be used to
improve maternal care. Increasing the voice of users could
increase democratic accountability by encouraging critical
reflection on the part of the governance committee and
providing motivation for change.36
Additional research could explore other models of
accountability in the context of community-governed
MWHs. For example, McDonald argues that the qualities of
commitment, cultural humility, and partnership are central
to social accountability.45 These qualities are demonstrated
when governance committee members are embedded in the
community, are respectful of the mores of the local culture,
and exhibit an egalitarian approach to solving problems
together with the community. Longer-term research could
try to measure how the governance committees exhibit these
qualities over time, and how to strengthen them to further
support social accountability.
Our study did not specifically examine the role of traditional
leaders vis-à-vis other formal leaders in the establishment
of the governance committees and in the oversight process.
This would be an important area of exploration in future
research. It is possible that involving traditional leaders more
intentionally from the start could have strengthened the
performance of the committees, though it is also possible that
traditional leaders could exert coercive pressures on MWH
governance decisions. Qualitative data from Zambia suggests
that traditional leaders are imposing financial penalties on
women who deliver at home.46 This was the case in Malawi,
where traditional leaders supported maternal, newborn, and
child health goals through a utilitarian, top-down model that
included fear, coercion, and punishment as tools for policy
implementation.47
Limitations
This study had several limitations. In observing meetings,
we were unable to record the gender, occupation, or other
demographic information for citizens raising questions at
meetings, so we cannot evaluate possible power imbalances
that may have limited certain perspectives from being
represented, a problem suggested in other studies.4 In
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addition, using project staff as meeting observers may have
introduced bias, as these staff had been mentoring the
committees for several years. Their familiarity gave them
background knowledge, but could have caused them to
emphasize certain aspects of meetings or overlook others,
based on the site. This limitation was somewhat mitigated
by using checklists to evaluate transparency of documents,
and by requiring staff to write down every question asked
and answered. The study may also have been biased by the
Hawthorne effect48: committee members may have changed
their behavior in response to the interest or attention of the
project staff who observed the annual meetings. Finally, the
analysis is based primarily on project record review and the
quality of the reports varied.
Conclusion
Our paper provides insights on the contextual conditions
for implementation of community-level accountability
interventions to increase internal transparency, something
that has been lacking in other studies.9 The findings suggest
that open public meetings and elections can be an effective
mechanism to increase accountability for health institutions
at the community level; however, governance committee
members need support and mentorship to adequately
prepare for and facilitate meetings and elections. The
process of educating committee members and stakeholders
to participate in community-led governance structures
takes time and should not be seen as a one-time investment.
Detailed study of open meetings can be helpful to reveal gaps
in understanding of policies and performance, and the data
collected can be used to develop contextually adapted training
and leadership development programs going forward.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank and acknowledge the work
of the Maternity Homes Alliance, the Ministry of Health, the
District and Provincial Health offices, and the Chiefs of the
study areas. Special thanks to Kaluba Mataka for her guidance,
and Karen Hussmann for her comments on an earlier version
of this manuscript.
Ethical issues

Ethical approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board at Boston
University (Ref No. H-35321) and from the ERES Converge IRB in Zambia (Ref.
No. 2016-June023). Permission was granted by the Zambia Ministry of Health
to conduct research at study sites. Informed consent was not required for this
particular study since only project records were used for this analysis.

Competing interests

All authors report institutional grants from MSD for Mothers, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation and The ELMA Foundation during the conduct of the study.

Authors’ contributions

NAS is the principal investigator and TV is a co-investigator of the overall
MWHs evaluation. NAS led the design and implementation of the intervention
and TV provided guidance for the governance aspect. MB and VIRS provided
supervision and mentorship to the governance committee members and
kept project records of the activities. TN supervised all field work. TV, RMF,
and JLK coded, analyzed, and interpreted data from the project records with
assistance from MB. TV and RMF primarily drafted and revised early version
of the manuscript, and JLK provided substantial revisions to the later drafts. All
authors provided critical revisions to the manuscript.

12

Disclaimer

The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to
publish, or preparation of the manuscript. The content is solely the responsibility
of the authors and does not reflect positions or policies of MSD for Mothers, the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, or The ELMA Foundation.

Funding

This program was developed and implemented in collaboration with MSD for
Mothers, MSD’s 10-year, $500 million initiative to help create a world where no
woman dies giving life. MSD for Mothers is an initiative of Merck & Co., Inc.,
Kenilworth, NJ, USA [grant number MRK 1846-06500.COL]. The development
of this article was additionally supported in part by the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation [grant number OPP1130329] and The ELMA Foundation [grant
number ELMA-15-F0017].

Authors’ affiliations
School of Nursing and Health Professions, University of San Francisco, San
Francisco, CA, USA. 2Department of Global Health, Boston University School
of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA. 3Department of Research, Right to Care
Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia. 4Department of Programs, Amref Health Africa,
Lusaka, Zambia.
1

Supplementary files

Supplementary file 1. Description of Stakeholder Groups Attending Annual
General Meeting, Zambia.
Supplementary file 2. Reporting Transparency Criteria.
Supplementary file 3. Templates for the Annual General Meeting Agenda,
Activity Report, and Finance Report.

References
1.

Black RE, Taylor CE, Arole S, et al. Comprehensive review of the
evidence regarding the effectiveness of community-based primary
health care in improving maternal, neonatal and child health: 8.
summary and recommendations of the Expert Panel. J Glob Health.
2017;7(1):010908. doi:10.7189/jogh.07.010908
2.
Anwari Z, Shukla M, Maseed BA, et al. Implementing peoplecentred health systems governance in 3 provinces and 11
districts of Afghanistan: a case study. Confl Health. 2015;9:2.
doi:10.1186/1752-1505-9-2
3.
McCoy DC, Hall JA, Ridge M. A systematic review of the literature
for evidence on health facility committees in low- and middle-income
countries. Health Policy Plan. 2012;27(6):449-466. doi:10.1093/
heapol/czr077
4.
Mafuta EM, Dieleman MA, Hogema LM, et al. Social accountability
for maternal health services in Muanda and Bolenge Health Zones,
Democratic Republic of Congo: a situation analysis. BMC Health
Serv Res. 2015;15(1):514. doi:10.1186/s12913-015-1176-6
5.
Lodenstein E, Molenaar JM, Ingemann C, et al. “We come as
friends”: approaches to social accountability by health committees
in Northern Malawi. BMC Health Serv Res. 2019;19(1):279.
doi:10.1186/s12913-019-4069-2
6.
Leppard M, Rashid S, Rahman A, Akhter M, Hashima N. Voice
and Accountability: The Role of Maternal, Neonatal, and Child
Health Committee; 2011. https://namati.org/resources/voiceand-accountability-role-of-maternal-neonatal-and-child-healthcommittee/. Accessed May 31, 2019.
7.
Brinkerhoff DW. Accountability and health systems: toward conceptual
clarity and policy relevance. Health Policy Plan. 2004;19(6):371-379.
doi:10.1093/heapol/czh052
8.
Hilber AM, Blake C, Bohle LF, Bandali S, Agbon E, Hulton L.
Strengthening accountability for improved maternal and newborn
health: a mapping of studies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Int J Gynecol
Obstet. 2016;135(3):345-357. doi:10.1016/j.ijgo.2016.09.008
9.
Van Belle S, Boydell V, George AS, Brinkerhof DW, Khosla R.
Broadening understanding of accountability ecosystems in sexual
and reproductive health and rights: a systematic review. PLoS One.
2018;13(5):e0196788. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0196788
10. Lee H-Y, Yang B-M, Kang M. Control of corruption, democratic
accountability, and effectiveness of HIV/AIDS official development
assistance. Glob Health Action. 2016;9(1):30306. doi:10.3402/gha.
v9.30306

International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–13

Vian et al
11.

12.

13.
14.

15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.
27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

Gilson L. Trust and the development of health care as a social
institution. Soc Sci Med. 2003;56(7):1453-1468. doi:10.1016/
S0277-9536(02)00142-9
Mwinga A, Moodley K. Engaging with Community Advisory Boards
(CABs) in Lusaka Zambia: perspectives from the research team
and CAB members. BMC Med Ethics. 2015;16(1):39. doi:10.1186/
s12910-015-0031-y
Adams B. Public Meetings and the Democratic Process. Public Adm
Rev. 2004;64(1):43-54. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00345.x
Asahak S, Albrecht SL, De Sanctis M, Barnett NS. Boards of
directors: assessing their functioning and validation of a multidimensional measure. Front Psychol. 2018;9:2425. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2018.02425
Mannion R, Davies H, Freeman T, Millar R, Jacobs R, Kasteridis P.
Overseeing oversight: governance of quality and safety by hospital
boards in the English NHS. J Health Serv Res Policy. 2015;20(1
suppl):9-16. doi:10.1177/1355819614558471
Sheaff R, Endacott R, Jones R, Woodward V. Interaction between
non-executive and executive directors in English National Health
Service trust boards: an observational study. BMC Health Serv Res.
2015;15(1):470. doi:10.1186/s12913-015-1127-2
Jha A, Epstein A. Hospital governance and the quality of care. Health
Aff (Millwood). 2010;29(1):182-187. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0297
Heald D. Varieties of Transparency. In: Transparency: The Key
to Better Governance? British Academy; 2006. doi:10.5871/
bacad/9780197263839.003.0002
Barr A, Fafchamps M, Owens T. The governance of nongovernmental organizations in Uganda. World Dev. 2005;33(4):657679.
doi:10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2004.09.010
Buckland-Merrett GL, Kilkenny C, Reed T. Civil society engagement
in multi-stakeholder dialogue: a qualitative study exploring the
opinions and perceptions of MeTA members. J Pharm Policy Pract.
2017;10:5. doi:10.1186/s40545-016-0096-0
Scott NA, Kaiser JL, Vian T, et al. Impact of maternity waiting
homes on facility delivery among remote households in Zambia:
protocol for a quasiexperimental, mixed-methods study. BMJ Open.
2018;8(8):e022224.
doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-022224
Kaiser JL, Mcglasson KL, Rockers PC, et al. Out-of-pocket
expenditure for home and facility- based delivery among rural
women in Zambia : a mixed-methods, cross-sectional study. Int J
Womens Health. 2019;11:411-430. doi:10.2147/IJWH.S214081
Lo B, Bayer R. Establishing ethical trials for treatment and prevention
of AIDS in developing countries. BMJ. 2003;327(7410):337-339.
doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7410.337
Sakanga VI, Chastain P, McGlasson KL, et al. Building financial
management capacity for community ownership of development
initiatives in rural Zambia. Int J Health Plann Manage. 2020;35(1):3651. doi:10.1002/hpm.2810
Papp SA, Gogoi A, Campbell C. Improving maternal health through
social accountability: A case study from Orissa, India. Glob Public
Health. 2013;8(4):449-464. doi:10.1080/17441692.2012.748085
Piotrowski SJ, Borry E. An analytic framework for open meetings
and transparency. Public Adm Manag. 2010;15(1):138-176.
Bjorkman M, Svensson J. Power to the people: evidence from a
randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in
Uganda. Q J Econ. 2009;124(2):735-769.
Borg R, Toikka A, Primmer E. Social capital and governance:
a social network analysis of forest biodiversity collaboration in
Central Finland. For Policy Econ. 2015;50:90-97. doi:10.1016/J.
FORPOL.2014.06.008
Chriest A, Niles M. The role of community social capital for food
security following an extreme weather event. J Rural Stud.
2018;64:80-90.
doi:10.1016/J.JRURSTUD.2018.09.019
Scott H, Danel I. Accountability for improving maternal and newborn
health. Best Pract Res Clin Obstet Gynaecol. 2016;36:45-56.
doi:10.1016/j.bpobgyn.2016.05.009
Mukinda FK, Van Belle S, George A, Schneider H. The crowded

32.

33.

34.
35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.
46.

47.

48.

space of local accountability for maternal, newborn and child health:
a case study of the South African health system. Health Policy Plan.
2020;35(3):279-290. doi:10.1093/heapol/czz162
Country Coordinating Mechanism Policy Including Principles and
Requirements Purpose and Structure. The Global Fund website.
https://www.theglobalfund.org/media/6019/core_globalfund_
framework_en.pdf. Accessed January 3, 2020. Published 2018.
Schmets G, Dheepa R, Sowmya K. Strategizing National Health in
the 21st Century: A Handbook. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health
Organization; 2016.
The World Bank Group. The World Bank Group Consultation
Guidelines. Washington DC: The World Bank; 2019.
Marston C, Hinton R, Kean S, et al. Community participation for
transformative action on women’s, children’s and adolescents’
health. Bull World Health Organ. 2016;94(5):376-382. doi:10.2471/
BLT.15.168492
Béhague DP, Kanhonou LG, Filippi V, Lègonou S, Ronsmans C.
Pierre Bourdieu and transformative agency: A study of how patients
in Benin negotiate blame and accountability in the context of severe
obstetric events. Sociol Heal Illn. 2008;30(4):489-510. doi:10.1111/
j.1467-9566.2007.01070.x
Sialubanje C, Massar K, Van Der Pijl MSG, Kirch EM, Hamer DH,
Ruiter RAC. Improving access to skilled facility-based delivery
services: Women’s beliefs on facilitators and barriers to the
utilisation of maternity waiting homes in rural Zambia. Reprod
Health. 2015;12:61. doi:10.1186/s12978-015-0051-6
Scott NA, Vian T, Kaiser JL, et al. Listening to the community:
using formative research to strengthen maternity waiting homes
in Zambia. PLoS One. 2018;13(3):e0194535. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0194535
Kurji J, Gebretsadik LA, Wordofa MA, et al. Factors associated
with maternity waiting home use among women in Jimma Zone,
Ethiopia: A multilevel cross-sectional analysis. BMJ Open.
2019;9(8):e028210.
doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-028210
Marker S, Mohr M, Østergaard D. Simulation-based training of junior
doctors in handling critically ill patients facilitates the transition to
clinical practice: an interview study. BMC Med Educ. 2019;19(1):11.
doi:10.1186/s12909-018-1447-0
Parker KW, DiPietro Mager NA, Aronson BD, Hart C. Using a mock
board of pharmacy disciplinary hearing to teach concepts related
to administrative law, addiction, empathy, and professionalism.
Curr Pharm Teach Learn. 2018;10(11):1512-1517. doi:10.1016/j.
cptl.2018.08.009
Goodridge D, Westhorp G, Rotter T, Dobson R, Bath B. Lean and
leadership practices: development of an initial realist program
theory. BMC Health Serv Res. 2015;15(1):362. doi:10.1186/s12913015-1030-x
Mianda S, Voce A. Developing and evaluating clinical leadership
interventions for frontline healthcare providers: a review of the
literature. BMC Health Serv Res. 2018;18(1):747. doi:10.1186/
s12913-018-3561-4
Ensor T, Cooper S. Overcoming barriers to health service access:
influencing the demand side. Health Policy Plan. 2004;19(2):69-79.
doi:10.1093/heapol/czh009
Macdonald WAS. Social accountability: Nunavut perspective. Can
Fam Physician. 2016;62(5):377-379.
Greeson D, Sacks E, Masvawure TB, et al. Local adaptations to a
global health initiative: penalties for home births in Zambia. Health
Policy Plan. 2016;31(9):1262-1269. doi:10.1093/heapol/czw060
Walsh A, Matthews A, Manda-Taylor L, et al. The role of the
traditional leader in implementing maternal, newborn and child
health policy in Malawi. Health Policy Plan. 2018;33(8):879-887.
doi:10.1093/heapol/czy059
Sedgwick P, Greenwood N. Understanding the hawthorne effect.
BMJ. 2015;351. doi:10.1136/bmj.h4672

International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–13

13

